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rms, where the latter perceives
heterogeneity among the productivity of domestic workers. This results in the
skills acquisition decision and foreign subsidiaries operational mode choice to
be determined along the same ability distribution of the host economy. This
subsequently determines the shares of the di¤erent types of multinationals in a
host economy. Parameterised for Malaysia, policy experiments are conducted.
A balanced investment liberalisation measure for all foreign rms is found to
outperform measure targeting only selected types, though there is a threshold
doing-business cost value below which such a standalone FDI-promoting policy
does not generate positive growth e¤ect. This then calls for composite pro-
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1 Introduction
Ever since Saggi (2002) documented the scarcity of studies modelling the relative im-
portance of the di¤erent types of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the industrial
transformation process of developing economies, this remains an under-studied area in
the growth literature. In the areas of industrial transformation, recent studies such
as Agénor and Dinh (2013) developed a growth framework with heterogeneous labour.
However, they do not account for foreign multinationals (MNCs), which along with hu-
man capital, have been documented in contributions such as Nelson and Pack (1999)
and Amsden (2001) to play a signicant role in the East Asian development experience.
Moreover, the impact of FDI on economic growth, their interaction with domestic hu-
man capital, as well as the determination of the di¤erent composition of FDI types
within a developing host economy, remain elusive in the FDI-growth literature, more
so in terms of theoretical model of endogenous growth with elements of industrial
transformation. While the existing empirical literature did ll some gaps, there re-
main a wide range of contradictory ndings in terms of whether FDI does promote
domestic innovation and consequently, growth1. To further complicate matters, contri-
butions such as Markusen and Tromenko (2009) argue that, to truly understand the
knowledge conduit role of foreign MNCs in a developing host economy, a study should
attempt to model FDI in a more disaggregated form [instead of its traditional stock
measure] the foreign experts themselves since innovation expertise is embodied in
human capital2. In spite of these complications, what we do know from the literature
are that: (i) there seems to be some form of sequential entry dynamics for foreign
1For instance, Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) are examples of
studies that found negative or insignicant spillover and growth e¤ects, whereas Borensztein et al.
(1998) and Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) are examples of studies that nd positive e¤ects.
2Markusen and Tromenko (2009) do attempt to model the micro-mechanism associated with
foreign experts. However, their model is not based on a general equilibrium framework, therefore
does not allow for the examination of the FDI-human capital nexus within the context of industrial
transformation and economic growth.
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subsidiaries with regards to the operational mode chosen for their activities in a host
economy [as in Dunnings (1997) renowned OLI [Ownership-Location-Internalisation
advantages] framework]; and (ii) some non-linear, non-direct relationships between
FDI and human capital within a host economy, suggesting potential room for policy
complementarities between human capital policies and foreign investment liberalisation
measures [Blomström and Kokko 2003; Kottaridi and Stengos 2010].
This paper attempts to ll these gaps in the literature by extending the FDI-
less multi-sectorial industrial transformation framework of Agénor and Dinh (2013) to
address this FDI-human capital-imitation-innovation-growth nexus in the context of a
developing host economy. A completely new, stylised foreign expert-based institutional
framework for MNC operations is developed to determine the FDI composition in
a developing host economy3. Second, in the context of Dunnings OLI framework,
this can be viewed as another theoretical contribution in that we attempt to formally
model internalisation advantagefor the rst time in an endogenous growth setting, as
being driven by the presence of asymmetric views by foreign experts on productivity
of domestic workers. Third, as productivity is a transformation of ability, the skills
acquisition decision and foreign subsidiariesoperational mode choice are linked along
the same ability distribution of the host economy a novel theoretical feature. Further,
consistent with well-documented stylised facts in the FDI literature, an additional
asymmetry between Vertical MNC and other MNCs is also modelled. These then
allow us to study both the long-run and transitional e¤ects of human capital and
3The framework is developed in consistent with the dualistic nature of FDI in developing countries,
where foreign MNCs tend to treat host economy as merely an investment platform with little inter-
dependence between MNCs and local markets [see Feder (1983) and Aurangzeb and Stengos (2014)].
Nevertheless, while the dualistic nature of studies in the tradition of Feder (1982) arises due to the
characteristics of export platform FDI (EPFDI), the dualistic nature here arises due to foreign experts
having additional quality preferences. This, the high-dimensionality of the model, and that the key
issue examined is the determination of MNC-composition and how they are tied to human capital in
a host economy, mean developing a model framework without explicitly considering exports will be
su¢ cient to understand the issues at stake.
3
FDI-promoting policies, as well as a composite of these policies.
To preview, the policy experiment results show that the implementation of foreign
investment liberalisation measures in a typical developing host economy is not a matter
of straightforward provision of investment incentives. Indeed, we nd that an invest-
ment liberalisation measure that is balanced and targeting all types of foreign rms
is more innovation- and skills acquisition-promoting than disproportionate ones biased
towards selected types of foreign rms. Further, in the context of the parameterised
version of the model, a threshold doing-business cost value is identied for the FDI-
growth nexus, below which standalone investment liberalisation measure is no longer
enough to drive output growth. Overall, the results underline the importance of com-
bining human capital and FDI-promoting policies to drive industrial transformation,
especially if the government of a host economy intends to maximise the benets of
policy complementarities. Indeed, such a composite programme is more e¤ective when
there is a high rate of technological di¤usion in the host economy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Given the scarcity of literature and
the inherent di¢ culties in the modelling of the di¤erent types of MNCs in a developing
host economy, Section 2 provides a brief discussion on the rationale of the modelling
approach for the MNC-composition framework, guided by the FDI literature on the
various policy issues that the model attempts to address. Section 3 presents an overview
of the model. Model calibrations are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, the various
policy experiments analysed are reviewed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 FDI heterogeneity in developing host economy
To guide the construction of a MNC-composition framework for such an inherently het-
erogeneous phenomenon, we introduce a hierarchy of internalisation decision-making
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with regards to MNCmode. Having rst di¤erentiated vertically-integrated MNCs into
innovation-enhancing and non-knowledge type and lumped the latter with other non-
mandatory investment commitments [to be categorised generally as Nonmandated ], we
can establish an order of Nonmandated-Horizontal-Vertical MNC types that matches
their respective importance in the host economys spillover. This is based on a survey
of the literature on FDI and economic development, where there appears to be di¤erent
roles played by di¤erent types of MNCs across di¤erent production activities of a host
economy.
Empirically, global FDI ows are documented by Brainard (1997) and Markusen
and Maskus (2002) to be predominantly driven by Horizontal MNCs. However, their
denition of FDI composition is based on the Horstmann-Markusen-Venables (HMV)
interpretation [Horstmann and Markusen 1987, 1996; Markusen and Venables 1999],
which tends to ignore the di¤erent aspects of factor endowment considerations that
leads to a necessary further distinction of vertically-integrated MNC activities. As doc-
umented in international production fragmentation studies such as Athukorala (2005),
Athukorala and Hill (2010), the fragmented production process of vertically-integrated
MNCs often generates various niches across di¤erent value chains that have vastly dif-
ferent resource requirements, with some being more technological- and skill-intensive
than others. Moreover, the various FDI-targeting rules and ownership stipulations im-
posed in developing economies often inadvertently result in many nonmandated sub-
sidiaries of MNCs, in forms such as technological licensing agreements and minority
stakes in joint-ventures [Saggi 2002]. As MNCs often treat such commitments as non-
mandated subsidiaries internally, these result in MNCs that are neither imitation- nor
innovation-enhancing [see DCosta (2002), for example]. We group these MNC mode
as Nonmandated MNC.
Consistent with Dunning, rms are said to opt for Horizontal over Vertical mode
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as the initial form of entry due to know-how advantage over rivals, and the latter tends
to be more costly too [Markusen 1995; Horstmann and Markusen 1996]. However,
due to factors such as agency or information cost, MNCs tend to rst establish basic
nonmandated subsidiaries as default entry mode [Saggi 2002], which does not seem
to play much of a role in driving industrial development, save for in the poorest low-
income economies deprived of basic industrial structures. After that, both Horizontal
and Vertical MNCs tend to invest in knowledge-intensive industries and therefore prefer
host economies with human capital [Borensztein et al. 1998]. However, given that the
costs incurred by not getting access to high quality human capital is much lower for
horizontal operations, foreign rms would more likely opt for the Horizontal MNC
mode. Indeed, foreign subsidiaries are only inclined to send in foreign experts with
sophisticated innovation know-how if the pool of human capital of a host economy is
highly productive [Gersbach and Schmutzler 2011]. This implies that the top foreign
experts coming in via Vertical MNCs are likely to have an additional layer of preference
to distinguish the brightest of the most skilled workers.
For a developing host economy with some stocks of human capital, a Horizontal
MNC is likely to benet the imitation activities, while a Vertical MNC would bene-
t innovation. Furthermore, a mixture of policies is often needed in the context of
middle-income economies as they often do not have the appropriate policy combina-
tion to improve technology transfer, absorption capacity, and di¤usion [Agénor 2016].
Given that there appears to be indirect, nonlinear relationships between human capital
and FDI-promoting policies, the use of a mixture of these policies will have to be exam-
ined. Nonetheless, as pointed out in studies such as Blomström (2002), OECD (2008),
and Olney (2013), overly narrowed investment incentives have also been documented
to result in adverse signalling e¤ects for many host countries, in that many generous
incentives targeted solely at top quality MNCs have failed to achieve intended results.
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This is often known as the key nding of the race-to-the-bottomliterature a phe-
nomenon that can be explained by the increasing cost feature [faced by leading foreign
innovation experts] introduced in the model, as seen later.
3 The Model
The domestic sector is largely similar to Agénor and Dinh (2013), though non-pecuniary
externalities associated with presence of foreign experts are introduced in the knowl-
edge sectors. Specically, the skills acquisition feature and ve production sectors are
retained. For the foreign sector, to avoid further complicating a sophisticated model,
the determination of the di¤erent types of foreign subsidiary mode operating in the
host economy is largely independent of domestic production.
It is assumed that there is only one foreign source country that deploys subsidiary
units in the form of experts to the host economy. Dunnings internalisation advantage
seeks to understand how foreign MNCs shape their in-housepreference with respect
to the involvement in di¤erent production of a host economy. To construct a stylised
framework that links this idea to the human capital distribution of the host economy,
we adopt a nested Dixit-Stiglitz CES value function framework that is often used em-
pirically to model heterogeneous rms along a continuous distribution [see Brambilla
et al. (2009) for example]. Further, each subsidiary unit consists of one foreign expert
with specic process know-how that is only available in the foreign source country.
Specically, standardisation know-how [used in imitation] for Horizontal MNC, and
sophisticated know-how [used in innovation] for Vertical MNC. Consequently, the pres-
ence of Vertical MNC is a necessary condition for innovation sector to exist. As our
focus is on middle-income economy with both imitation and innovation sectors, the
role of nonmandated subsidiaries in domestic production is abbreviated, modelled only
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as a base entry mode.
As a result of foreign rms being e¤ectively experts with specialised human capital,
a dichotomous relationship exists between domestic and foreign rms. For domestic
rms, only the average productivity of workers matters. For foreign subsidiaries, they
perceiving heterogeneity among the productivity of domestic workers. As individual
ability of domestic workers is not fully observable to foreign rms [though they do
know the overall distribution], for two di¤erent skilled workers used to produce a same
blueprint variety, foreign experts would have an additional layer of preference to be
matchedto a worker with higher productivity a trasformation of ability hence re-
sulting in a Melitz (2003) type of sorting process. In deciding on operational mode,
foreign experts are therefore sorted along the ability distribution of the host economy,
resulting in di¤erent threshold values for di¤erent modes of operation. Consequently,
these create an indirect link between the foreign MNCsoperational choice and domes-
tic workersskills acquisition decision, due to the implicit productivity requirement-
induced information cost4. Lastly, a demand feedback channel from the industrial
state of host economy to MNC composition-determination is also introduced using an
endogenous preference parameter in the foreign expertsobjective function, consistent
with the international product market dimension described by Felipe et al. (2012).
3.1 Domestic Sectors in Host Economy
Households: There is a continuum of dynastic representative households growing at
an exogenous rate n > 0. Given initial number of members , L0 in each household, the
size of the representative family at time t is Lt = exp(nt)L0. Each individual within a
4Uncertainty of such nature may broadly be known as some sort of information cost, arising from
asymmetry in either demand or supply factors. An example of such cost is examined in Hortsmann
and Markusen (1996), though our paper specically attempts to link this choice of MNCs to the ability
distribution of workers in the host economy.
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household is assumed to possess identical ability level, a, though di¤erent abilities are
assumed at the household level. Ability follows a Pareto distribution, indexed by a 2
[am;1), with probability density function f(a) = am=a1+, cumulative distribution
function F (a) = 1  (am=a), and mean ability of the population am=(  1),  > 2
and am > 1. Solving the households intertemporal utility maximisation problem,
maxUat =
Z 1
t
exp[ (  n)(s  t)]L0

1  (cat )1=
1  1


ds; (1)
subject to budget constraint, _W at = rtW
a
t + (1  )Yt   Ltcat , yields the familiar Euler
equation at the aggregate level,
_Ct
Ct
= (rt   ) + n: (2)
Note that rt is the riskfree market interest rate, Yt the economys output of nal
goods,  2 (0; 1) the tax rate on income,  > 0 the subjective discount rate,  the
constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and the utility function of individual
household member [depends on individual members consumption, cat ] assumes a con-
stant relative risk aversion form. It is also assumed that agents do not value leisure,
hence face no disutility from working or skills acquisition. Each representative house-
hold allocates consumption equally among its members, and is not allowed to borrow.
In terms of skills acquisition, individual members decide whether to acquire skills
or work immediately as unskilled workers, taking wages and interest rate as given.
Skill acquisition decisions are therefore made to maximise the discounted wage income.
An individual with ability a 2 [am;1), fully observable by both domestic rms and
individuals, can either choose to enter the labour force at t as an unskilled worker
to earn wage wUt [independent of workers ability], or decide to undergo training by
incurring a training cost,  , with e¢ ciency of training being  > 0, before entering
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labour force at t + T as a skilled worker and earns awSt . Based on a generalised
specication of Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), an individual with ability a 2
[am;1) would therefore opt to become a skilled worker if and only if
Z 1
t+T
exp[ (s  t)]awSs ds  tct 
Z 1
t
exp[ (s  t)]wUs ds; (3)
where tct =
R1
t+T
exp[ (s   t)] awSs ds is the discounted value of the cost, assumed
to be proportional to the skilled wages at   2 (0; 1).
There exists a threshold level of ability a^t such that (3) holds as an equality, ex-
pressed as a^t = [exp(T ):(wUt =(1    )wSt )]1=. If skills acquisition is assumed to take
place instantaneously5, we can simplify it to
a^t = [w
U
t =(1   )wSt ]1=: (4)
Given Pareto distribution and that productivity of unskilled workers is assumed to
equal unity, the share of unskilled labour supply, U;t at time t equals
U;t =
LU;t
Lt
=
Z a^t
am
f(a)da = [1  (am=a^t)] : (5)
Given (5), the raw supply of skilled labour at time t is calculated as Lt
R1
a^t
f(a)da =
(am=a^t)
Lt, while the share of the e¤ective supply (having accounted for average pro-
ductivity of workers) of skilled labour, S;t, is
S;t =
LS;t
Lt
=
Z 1
a^t
af(a)da =
am
  1(a^t)
1 : (6)
5Given the innite horizon nature of the model, we follow Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2001) and
Agénor and Dinh (2013) in imposing the assumption of T = 0. Knowing that individuals live forever
in this model, any training period specied within (0; T ) is small with respect to innity and therefore
is treated as taking place instantaneously.
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Imitation: The imitation sector produces imitative blueprints that are purchased
by rms producing basic intermediate inputs in the intermediate goods sector. Firms
specialized in imitation employ only unskilled labour, in quantity LU;I;t. There is no
aggregate uncertainty in the research technology. The production ow, _M It at any time
t is given by expressed as:
_M It = (nFH;t)
 I1(M It +  
I
2nFV;tM
R
t )(
LU;I;t
Lt
); where  I1  0 and  I2 2 R, (7)
with the specication of LU;I;t=Lt consistent with the dilution e¤ect discussed in
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).
The productivity component of imitative goods depends on: (i) a standard initial
stock of blueprints (M It ), as in Joness (2005) standing-on-shoulderse¤ect, though
at constant return [Ang and Madsen, 2015] ; (ii) size of the presence of Horizontal
MNCs, which given our denition of foreign rms, refers to the total number of foreign
experts that bring know-howto imitation production [expressed in proportion of total
foreign rms, nFH;t]; and (iii) an externality term associated with the size of Vertical
MNCs in the innovation sector. As discussed earlier and implied in studies such as
Markusen and Maskus (2002), on aggregate, Horizontal FDIs are most likely to be
imitation-enhancing, though an argument could be made for  I1 < 0 if multinationals
preemptively price domestic competition out of markets using their ownership of su-
perior technology, as described in Horstmann and Markusen (1987). The externality
term,  I2nFV;tM
R
t , indicates a spillover channel from the innovation sector. Consistent
with the industrial transformation process, as the size of the innovation sector grows
and more foreign subsidiaries opt to switch to operating as Vertical MNCs, we would
expect the sign of  I2 to be negative. Nonetheless, given that positive empirical evidence
is also reported in some studies with regards to leading foreign innovatorsimpacts on
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domestic rmsproductivity, there is a possibility of a mildly positive  I2 too
6. As
such, the parameter,  I2, as well as the stepping stone parameter,  
R
2 (introduced in
the innovation sector), are examined across di¤erent values using sensitivity analysis.
The optimisation problem of rms in the imitation sector is to select the amount of
unskilled labour to employ so as to maximise prots of It = R
I
t
_M It   (1 + I)wUt LU;I;t,
subject to (7), taking the imitative blueprint price (RIt ) and unskilled wage rate (w
U
t ) as
given. The parameter I is introduced as a proportionate cost factor in the imitation
sector that captures the impact of labour market distortions (for instance, additional
hiring and ring costs arising from non-competitive labour market practices). The
interior solution for unskilled labour employment in imitation (LU;I;t > 0) is given by:
wUt =
1
1 + I
RIt
I
t
Lt
: (8)
Innovation: Firms in the more skill-intensive innovation sector produce innovative
blueprints using only skilled labour (LS;R;t). There is no aggregate uncertainty in
innovation. The research production ow at any time t is given by
_MRt = (nFV;t)
 R1 (MRt +  
R
2M
I
t )(
LS;R;t
Lt
), where  R1  0 and  R2  0. (9)
As in the imitation sector, the production technology of innovative goods captures
the key knowledge spillover properties. Following Agénor and Dinh (2013), the research
process of innovation depends on both the stock of innovative and imitative blueprints,
consistent with the stepping stone e¤ect of imitation introduced by Glass (2010). The
productivity gains associated with stepping stone e¤ect of imitative goods may be
6Empirical studies specically in the area of international production networks, such as Athukorala
(2005) and Kam (2013), nd the presence of a positive productivity spillover from leading foreign
innovators to the productivity of domestic imitators, notably component part suppliers in the host
economy. On the contrary, studies such as Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Djankov and Hoekman
(2000) document negative e¤ects of foreign rms on domestic rmsproductivity.
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equal, stronger ( R2 > 1), or weaker ( 
R
2 < 1) than that of innovative goods. Consistent
with studies such as Markusen (1995, 1998) and Braconier et al. (2005), Vertical
MNCs, nFV;t, are specied as the relatively skill-intensive type that engage in leading-
edge innovation and therefore beneciary to domestic innovation of host economy.
Similar to the imitation sector, nFV;t refers to the total number of foreign experts that
bring sophisticated know-how to innovation production in the domestic economy.
Likewise, to eliminate scale e¤ects, innovation employment is specied as a ratio to
total population.
The optimisation problem of rms in the innovation sector is to select the amount
of skilled labour to employ so as to maximise prots, Rt = Q
R
t
_MRt   (1 + R)wSt LS;R;t,
subject to (9), taking the patent price (QRt ) and skilled wage rate (w
S
t ) as given. The
wage in the innovation sector is a¤ected proportionally again by a cost parameter R.
Consistent with studies such as Haaland and Wooton (2001), R > I is assumed,
which means it is comparatively more expensive to hire skilled workers in innovation
than unskilled workers in imitation.
For an interior solution for skilled labour employment in innovation to exist (LS;R;t >
0), the rst-order condition is given by
wSt = (
1
1 + R
)(
QRt
Lt
)(nFV;t)
 R1 [1 +  R2 (
mIt
mRt
)]MRt : (10)
Intermediate Goods: The two intermediate goods (IG) sectors are monopolistically
competitive. Each producer in the basic IG sector pays a one-o¤ royalty payment, RIt ,
to purchase one unit of imitative blueprint to produce one unit of basic intermediate
input, while each rm in the sophisticated IG sector pay patent price, QRt , to purchase
one unit of innovative blueprint to produce one unit of sophisticated input. In both
sectors, each basic IG rm maximizes prots by setting price P k;st = 1= for good s,
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8s = 1; :::Mkt , where k = I; R.
In symmetric equilibrium, the associated quantity demanded for basic, xIt , and
sophisticated intermediate, xRt , at individual rm level are given by
xIt = (
Yt
M It
) and xRt = (1  )(
Yt
MRt
), (11)
where  2 (0; 1) is the share of basic intermediates in composite intermediates.
In terms of blueprint prices, it is derived that the maximum prot for basic IG
producers in a current period t is given by
It = (1  )(
Yt
M It
): (12)
Standard arbitrage implies that the blueprint price must equal to the present dis-
counted stream of prots. For simplicity, we follow Agénor and Canuto (2012) and
assume that all the prots of an imitative blueprint, excluding capital gain, go into the
imitative blueprint price, RIt set in equilibrium. This yields R
I
t = 
I
t .
Meanwhile, unlike imitative blueprints, patented blueprints are innitely-lived.
Each sophisticated IG rm sets its price to maximise prots, given the perceived de-
mand function. Their maximum prot is derived as
Rt = (1  )(1  )(
Yt
MRt
): (13)
To derive the equilibrium price of a patent for sophisticated input, QRt , standard
no-arbitrage condition requires that the rate of return on private capital must equal to
the rate of return on the exclusive holding of an innovative blueprint for sophisticated
14
inputs, that is rt = Rt =Q
R
t + _Q
R
t =Q
R
t , which can be rearranged to yield
_QRt = rtQ
R
t   Rt : (14)
Final Output: There is a continuum of identical domestic rms producing a ho-
mogenous nal good, indexed by i 2 (0; 1). Production by individual domestic rm
i requires the use of rm-specic private capital, Kit , skilled labour, LS;Y;t, unskilled
labour, LU;Y;t, and composite intermediate input, X it . Production by individual rm i
takes the form of a standard Cobb-Douglas specication:
Y it = (LS;Y;i;t)
S(LU;Y;i;t)
U (X it)
(Kit)
[
Kt
(Lt)
]%; (15)
where % > 0,  > 0;  2 (0; 1), S 2 (0; 1), U 2 (0; 1),  2 (0; 1), and +(S+U)+ =
1 to reect constant returns to scale in rm-specic inputs LS;Y;i;t, LU;Y;i;t, X it , and
Kit . The economy-wide aggregate stock of private capital, Kt =
R 1
0
Kitdi, asserts a
conventional learning externality at magnitude %, but is subject to a congestion e¤ect
of  due to the total population size, Lt.
Standard prot maximisation by identical rms in a symmetric equilibrium yields
rst-order conditions for rt, wSt , w
U
t , x
I
s;t, and x
R
s;t. These are
rt = 
Yt
Kt
  ; (16)
wSt =
S
1 + Y
Yt
LS;Y;t
; wUt =
U
1 + Y
Yt
LU;Y;t
; (17)
xks;t = (
kZkt
P k;st
)1=(1 ); s = 1; :::M{t ; with Z
k
t = Yt=
Z Mkt
0
(xks;t)
ds; (18)
where k = I; R, I = , R = 1   , P I;st (PR;st ) is the price of basic (sophisticated)
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intermediate good s, wSt (w
U
t ) the skilled (unskilled) wage rate, rt the net rental rate
of private capital,  2 (0; 1) the depreciation rate of private capital, and Y the sector-
specic labour hiring cost mark-up.
Given that both the technology and demand for all specic intermediate type are the
same, the equilibrium for both intermediate types are symmetric too. In a symmetric
equilibrium,
RMIt
0
(xIs;t)
ds = M It (x
I
t )
 and
RMRt
0
(xRs;t)
ds = MRt (x
R
t )
. The composite
intermediate inputs can then be written as
Xt = [(M
I
t )
1=xIt ]
 [(MRt )
1=xRt ]
1  ; (19)
where xIs;t, s 2 (0;M It ) refers to basic intermediate inputs, xRs;t, s 2 (0;MRt ) sophisti-
cated intermediate inputs,  2 (0; 1) and 1=(1  ) > 1 the price elasticity of demand
for each intermediate input.7
To derive an expression for the aggregate nal output of the economy, the number
of rms engaged in the production of nal goods is normalised to unity, Yt =
R 1
0
Y it di,
which implies that on aggregate, LS;Y;t =
R 1
0
LS;Y;i;tdi, LU;Y;t =
R 1
0
LU;Y;i;tdi. Using (15),
the aggregate nal output Yt can be written as
Yt = (LS;Y;t)
S(LU;Y;t)
U (Xt)
(Kt)
[
Kt
(Lt)
]%: (20)
Finally, the law of motion for the private capital is given by:
_Kt = It   Kt: (21)
7The coe¢ cient  is xed at a constant value for the benchmark case. However, for the endogenous
technological di¤usion case, it is modelled by a generalised logistic curve, where: t = f(mt) =
m +
(M m)
[1+expf (mt mI)g]1= , where m; M 2 (0; 1) are the lower and upper bounds (asymptotes) of
t,  the technological di¤usion rate,  > 0 the corresponding asymptote value, and mI the inection
point for the industrial composition ratio, mt.
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3.2 Foreign Sector
Stylised Framework to explain Internalisation advantage: To characterise
the mechanics of foreign subsidiariesdeployment, we use a three-staged, nested Dixit-
Stiglitz CES objective function framework adapted fromAllanson andMontagna (2005)
and Brambilla et al. (2009). In each period, it is assumed that there is a mass of foreign
subsidiaries, j = 1; :::; NF , entering the host economy, with the salaries/prots of the
experts/subsidiaries assumed, for simplicity, to be paid by the planner of the foreign
source economy.
Specically, in the rst stage, the planner of the foreign source economy determines
the allocation of aggregate salary expenditure for experts deployed overseas. Based on
a standard Cobb-Douglas value maximisation specication, max uFt = z
%
H;tz
1 %
q;t , in each
time period, where the exogenously given aggregate salary expenditure (IF ) is allocated
between salary expenditure for experts in our host economy of interest (zq) and for
simplicity, other host economies collectively (zH). This yields yFt = (1   %)IFt , where
yF is the total salary expenditure allocated for the specic host economy examined.
By denition, yFt = w
FNF;t too, where wF is some exogenously given wage rate paid
by the foreign headquarter and NF;t is the total number of foreign experts in the host
economy studied.
Having determined the allocation in the rst stage, a stylised institutional approach
is specied in the second stage. Depending on the mode chosen, investmentin the host
economy is assumed to be in terms of the intermediate variety an expert is randomly
matched to. Collectively, the pool of foreign experts assigned to the host economy
forms a representative value function over a composite of intermediate varieties, with
a further layer of shadow qualityascribed to capture the preference of foreign experts
to be matched to workers of higher productivity, within the same variety type that
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they are matched to.8
Specically, the value function is given by
UFt = f(
Z NF
j=0
[
Z MIt
s=0
1;t(x
I
s;FH;t)
F 1
F ds+
Z MRt
s=0
2;t(x
R
s;FV;t)
F 1
F ds]
F 1
F dj)g 
F
F 1 ; (22)
where M It , M
R
t denote the imitative and innovative varieties over Horizontal, x
I
s;FH;t,
and Vertical investments, xRs;FV;t; 
F and F are elasticities of substitution within and
between intermediates, with F > F > 1 assumed as in Brambilla et al. (2009). 2;t
and 1;t represent foreign preferences for investment of Vertical and Horizontal MNC
respectively.9 ;10
Solving the optimisation problem with a nested foreign preference structure would
yield a series of theoretical investment demand functions and shadow investment prices
for each variety s and productivity di¤erence-induced quality j.
FDI Compositions in Host Economy: In stage three, a rms dynamic entry
decision is modelled as a static decision in opting for investment mode.11 Upon en-
try, foreign rms rst assume a Nonmandated MNC mode and to simplify matters, no
subsequent exit is allowed. Further, in each period t, a rm can opt to stay as Nonman-
dated MNC [incurring a basic doing-businesscost of F0]; incurring additional cost, F1
on top of F0 to upgrade into Horizontal MNC; or incur F0+F2 to operate as a Vertical
8By construction, the quality di¤erencebetween investments in a host country for the foreign
experts in this model reects solely the perceived di¤erence in productivity between the workers
employed in the intermediates they are matched to.
9As shown later, foreign preferences are endogenous to the state of industrial development of a
host economy, providing a key feedback channel of the host economys industrial state to FDI via the
product market dimensions. Nevertheless, it is taken as given by the pool of foreign experts when
solving for the optimisation problem in every period.
10Since not all destinations of host economies have an innovation sector, we can set xRs;t = 0 in
the value function if we are interested in a host economy without an innovation sector. Also, since
we assume non-mandated subsidiaries play no role in domestic production, we do not optimize their
preferences.
11The heterogeneous foreign rms are assumed to behave in a homogenous manner within the same
FDI type.
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MNC. F2 > F1 > F0 is assumed. In the context of each foreign subsidiary being a
foreign expert, these mean foreign subsidiaries have the option to upgradeand bring
in an expert with more advanced processes in every period, by incurring higher cost.12
Unlike domestic rms, each foreign expert coming in with know-how perceives het-
erogeneity among productivity of domestic workers. This asymmetry leads to a pro-
ductivity requirement-induced information cost component, 1=$, that is implicitly
priced in by foreign experts when deciding on the choice of operational mode. This
productivity is a transformation of ability. For simplicity, a one-to-one relationship
is assumed, where $ = a=~a, with a being value along the ability distribution of the
host economy and 1 < ~a < 1 some exogenously specied constant value. 1=$ is
therefore also characterised by a Pareto distribution. Due to persistence, for those who
have become skilled, it is assumed that a more able individual pre-skills acquisition
would remain more productive over another individual with lower ability pre-skills ac-
quisition, resulting in a Melitz (2003) type of sorting of foreign subsidiaries on 1=$.
Specically, for any intermediate variety s at time t, solving (22), we can express an op-
timal shadow price of investment [from the perspective of foreign experts] as a function
of productivity, $, that is,
Ps;t =

F
F   1

($s;t) ; (23)
priced at F=(F   1) > 1 times of $s;t.13
This implies that, for any investment of variety s, the larger the productivity
requirement-induced information cost is (lower $s;t), the lower is the theoretical in-
12Consistent with the nature of most common doing-business costs surveyed, such as time to
acquire permits and number of administrative procedures in transactions, these costs are treated as
deadweight losses in this model.
13Given that the perceived quality di¤erence among investment is driven by perceived heterogeneity
among productivity of domestic workers, this price is implicit in nature and reects the valueplaced
by foreign experts on a specic intermediate variety s.
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vestment price ascribed by the foreign experts. The basic idea is as follows. While a
lower value of a^t from the labour supply side indicates a larger pool of skilled labour
in the host economy, a lower value of a from the perspective of foreign investors would
imply a stricter entry threshold. As derived later, we would expect the model spec-
ication to result in the order of the threshold values for the three FDI types to be
aFV < aFH < aFP , since a potential Vertical MNC would have a stricter entry thresh-
old [alternatively interpretable as needing a larger quantity/pool of skilled workers to
o¤set the higher productivity requirement] than a potential Horizontal MNC.
Further, as both an additional novel feature and to ensure the solution space is
bounded from below [a 2 [am;1)], a second source of asymmetry is introduced. Specif-
ically, when a foreign subsidiary is confronted with the decision to upgrade and bring
in experts with top know-how in innovation, the cost associated with the productivity
requirement is subject to a parameter , such that $ > 0; $0() < 0 is now priced by
the foreign experts to reect the increasing di¢ culties in telling apart the best (high-
est productivity) among the brightest of skilled workers. To explain this decreasing
return feature intuitively, say for example, as a given value of a gets smaller [1=$ gets
larger] and smaller [note that if from the supply side, it means the actual quantity
of skilled labour in host economy is actually larger], a negative value for parameter 
would indicate increasing di¢ culties in identifying and matching to the most produc-
tive skilled workers. As the pool of skilled workers gets larger, the brightest with the
highest productivity would be harder to distinguish from other skilled workers.
The two dichotomous features discussed in the foreign sector characterise the styl-
ised internalisation advantageframework that determines FDI compositions in this
model. Equation (23), together with theoretical investment demand functions across
di¤erent varieties, allow us to express individual value function for a typical foreign
expert j opting for either Nonmandated (FP ), Horizontal (FH), or Vertical (FV )
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operational mode [see Appendix B]. Imposing zero prots conditions for foreign ex-
perts across the three types, and on aggregate, Pj = Ps = LI is assumed in symmetric
equilibrium14, the three minimum threshold values for MNCsinternalisation decision
in any period t can be expressed as
$FP;t =
aFP;t
~a
=
"
F0 
(F   1)F 1=(F )F 1(yFt ) 1

P 
F 1
F;t
#1=(1 F )
; (24)
$FH;t =
aFH;t
~a
=
"
F1 
(F   1)F 1=(F )F 1(yFt ) 1

P 
F 1
F;t [
F
1;t (LI)
F F   1]
#1=(1 F )
;
(25)
$FV;t =
aFV;t
~a
=
"
(F2   F1) 
(F   1)F 1=(F )F 1(yFt ) 1

P 
F 1
F;t (LI)
F F [F2;t   F1;t ]
#1=[(1 F )]
;
(26)
where F0, F1, F2 are the doing-business costs; F , 
F , yFt , , 1;t, 2;t are as de-
ned earlier; and PF;t is a theoretical aggregate shadow investment price index that is
substituted out later.
To calculate the shares of foreign rms by FDI type, recall that the sorting of
foreign rms follows that of 1=$. We know that the cumulative distribution function
of a typical Pareto distribution z, takes the form of F (z) = 1   (zmin=z) for some
minimum of z, zmin. Let F (1=$) = F (~a=a). Further, by assuming that there is no exit
option for MNCs, we can set aFP = ~a=amin8t, where ~a=amin denotes some minimum
threshold value of entry by foreign rms (a large value along the ability distribution).
14This means the shadow price indices for the implicit investment price of between- (Ps) and
within-variety (Pj) are equalised, and assumed to be taken as given by the individual experts. As
explained further in the Appendix, for ease of modelling, we proxy this by a time-invariant structural
parameter, the Lerner Index, LI, which generalises market competitiveness hence a reection of the
implicit value of investment in the host economy.
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At any time t, the proportion of the three types of foreign rms are given by
nFP;t =
NFP;t
NF;t
= [F (1=$FH;t)  F (1=$FP;t)] = [1  (aFH;t
aFP
)] , (27)
nFH;t =
NFH;t
NF;t
= [F (1=$FV;t)  F (1=$FH;t)] = [(aFH;t
aFP
)   (aFV;t
aFP
)], (28)
nFV;t =
NFV;t
NF;t
= [1  F (1=$FV;t)] = (aFV;t
aFP
), (29)
where aFP , aFH , aFV give the host economy-specic threshold value of entry for Non-
mandated, Horizontal, and Vertical MNCs. While nFH;t in (28) is determined by both
aFH;t and aFV;t, given xed aFP , (29) shows that the lower the value of aFV [therefore
the stricter the entry criteria for Vertical MNC], the smaller share of Vertical MNCs in
the host economy. Also, (27) shows that the lower the value of aFH [therefore stricter
criteria for Horizontal MNC], the larger the share of Nonmandated MNCs.
Some straightforward algebraic manipulations using (24)-(26) allow us to substitute
out yFt and PF;t, and establish two threshold conditions of
aFH;t =

F0
F1
((LI)
F F (1;t)
F   1)
 1=(1 F )
aFP , and (30)
aFV;t =
"
F2   F1
F0
1
(LI)F F [F2;t   F1;t ]
#1=[(1 F )]
a
1=
FP ~a
( 1)=. (31)
In addition, a feedback channel on the state of industrial development of a host
economy to FDI composition is introduced. Specically, consistent with Gander et al.
(2009), we simplify by modelling the two foreign preference parameters 1and 2 using
a Weibull distribution, governed by a hazard function of
1 = [1  h(2;!k; !)]2 = [1  (
!k
!
(
2
!
)!k 1)]2, (32)
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where h(2;!k; !) denotes the hazard rate of 2
15, and !k and ! are the shape and
scale parameter respectively. As 1 is given by the expected value of E(2), this allows
us to endogenise foreign preference in a single parameter, QF , a demand-side feedback
channel depending on the state of industrial development of a host economy.
Finally, further substitutions of (30) and (31) into (27)-(29) would allow us to
express nFH;t and nFV;t in terms of the threshold values, as in
nFH;t =

F0
F1
((LI)
F F (QFt  1(QFt )!k)
F   1)
 =(1 F )
  nFV;t, and (33)
nFV;t =

a
1=
FP ~a
( 1)=
 "F2   F1
F0
1
(LI)F F [(QFt )
F   (QFt  1(QFt )!k)
F
]
#=[(1 F )]
;
(34)
where 1 = (!k=!)(1=!)!k 1, with _QF = _mIt assumed in each period for tractabil-
ity.16
As a result of the perceived heterogeneity of productivity among workers, and the
assumed ability-productivity relationship, the determination of nFH;t and nFV;t in any
period t is driven by the sorting process along the same ability distribution, and depends
on threshold ability values, aFH;t and aFV;t. Naturally, these result in some degree of
direct tradeo¤between nFH;t and nFV;t, as can be seen in (33), though it is also possible
that an economy can gain in both nFH;t and nFV;t.
15This means we assume that foreign investment preference in the mode of Horizontal MNC would
reduce over time in regards to investment preference in the mode of Vertical MNC. While this as-
sumption seems arbitrary, it provides a reasonable simplication that allows for feedback of industrial
state in the host economy to FDI composition through only a single foreign preference channel.
16The use of mIt in the feedback channel as a proxy that reects the state of industrial develop-
ment in a developing host economy is consistent with studies such as Yusuf and Nabeshima (2009).
It provides a more general feature given that there are developing host economies that have only
imitation production. Note that the industrial composition ratio, mt = mIt =(m
R
t +m
I
t ) can be used
in an alternative specication, though it comes with a lot more complications, and would make the
subsequently derived expressions for nFH;t and nFV;t analytically intractable.
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3.3 Government and Market-clearing Conditions
All the public policies simulated in this paper are assumed to be nanced by reallocating
spending within the budget, so that the tax rate remains the same and the overall
balance remains. As such, we can assume a simplied government, which maintains
a balanced budget and cannot borrow. At each time t, the government taxes on nal
output at the rate  to nance its expenditure Gt, as in
Gt = Yt: (35)
In terms of market-clearing conditions, for the nal goods market, we have
Yt = Ltc
a
t +M
I
t x
I
t +M
R
t x
R
t + It +Gt: (36)
For the skilled and unskilled labour markets, we have (in shares):
S;Y;t + S;R;t = S;t; and U;Y;t + U;I;t = U;t: (37)
For the foreign sector, in any given period t, the shares of foreign experts or sub-
sidiaries in Nonmandated, Horizontal, and Vertical mode in the host economy sum up
to one. With nFP;t derived residually, this means
nFP;t = 1  nFH;t   nFV;t , nFP;t  0. (38)
3.4 Dynamic System and Steady State
As shown in the Appendix, the solution of the system is characterised by a di¤erential
algebraic system consisting of four rst-order di¤erential equations (mRt , m
I
t , Q
R
t , z
C
t )
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and seven static equations (S;Y;t, U;Y;t, S;t, U;t, Yt=Kt, nFH;t, nFV;t). However, the
complexity of the system precludes a full analytical characterisation of the solution.
The steady-state equilibrium is dened as an equilibrium path where the growth rate
of the aggregate representative householdsconsumption (nt+( _cat =c
a
t )), the growth rate
of the private capital stock ( _Kt=Kt), the growth rate of imitative blueprints ( _M It =Mt),
and the growth rate of innovative blueprints ( _MRt =M
R
t ) are all equal, whereas the
imitative blueprint price (RIt ), the patent price (Q
R
t ), rate of return on private capital
(rt), real prices (P
I;s
t , P
R
t ), and shadow aggregate price index (PF;t) are constant. We
also know that Yt=Kt , 
S;Y
t , 
U;Y
t , 
U
t , 
S
t , nFH;t, and nFV;t are constant. These imply
that: (i) nal output, private capital stock, and private consumption all grow at the
same constant rate in the steady state; (ii) labour supplies grow at the same rate as
the population growth rate in steady state; and (iii) the number of foreign experts in
imitation, nFH;t, and innovation, nFV;t, are constant. In steady state, these constancies
indicate that the innovative blueprint-private capital ratio (mRt ), imitative blueprint-
private capital ratio (mIt ), as well as the private consumption-private capital ratio (z
C
t )
are constant, resulting in _mRt = _m
I
t = _z
C
t =
_QRt = 0. Hence, the steady-state values
~mI , ~mR, ~zC , and ~QR can then be determined numerically.
The complexity of the model also means that saddlepath stability cannot be es-
tablished analytically, though local stability in the vicinity of computationally de-
rived steady states can be established for selected congurations of model parameters.
Nonetheless, since it cannot be fully established analytically, some congurations of the
model may result in the model being locally indeterminate. This necessitates the use of
a computational method solving for a two-point boundary value problem in any policy
experiment, such as the relaxation algorithm proposed by Trimborn et al. (2008).17
17The relaxation algorithm is a specic type of nite-di¤erence method designed to overcome
typical problems faced when solving multi-dimensional continuous time growth models. In addition
to approximating the system of di¤erential equations with nite-di¤erence equations on a mesh of
25
Unlike most conventional numerical methods for continuous time, the relaxation algo-
rithm is more e¢ cient in dealing with high dimensional systems and therefore allows
us to trace out the unique transition dynamics numerically for each policy experiment
implemented. Likewise, local saddlepath stability is also established numerically by
calculating the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the linearised system for each simulation
case considered.
4 Benchmark Parameterisation
To illustrate possible impact of policies, the model is parameterised for an upper-middle
income country with both innovation and imitation sectors, as well as having non-zero
Vertical MNCs. Malaysia, a Southeast Asian economy that has successfully positioned
itself as part of the global production value chain of foreign MNCs yet struggles to
switch to an innovation-led growth strategy, is chosen as the economy studied.
On the household side, the annual discount rate, , and the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, , are set at fairly conventional values of 0:04 and 0:27 [Agénor and
Montiel 2008]. L0 is normalised to unity, with the constant population growth rate, n,
set at the ve-year average of 1:73 percent as in 2008-12. The supply of skilled labour
is measured in e¢ cient units of human capital, and is therefore adjusted for average
ability. For calibration purposes, given that rm-level distribution of skills and training
expenditure in Malaysia are not reported in surveys [Sander and Hanusch 2012], the
number of e¤ective skilled labour in the model is dened as the number of workers
with tertiary education. The parameterisation strategies for the remaining household
parameters would therefore focus on producing an initial share of skilled workers, S
points in time, the algorithm also applies a typical error minimisation procedure of shooting method
when calculating the time path of solutions. See Trimborn et al. (2008) for a full description of the
algorithm.
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at 0:240. This involves assuming initial skills acquisition cost,  , to be high at 25
percent of skilled wages, though given the recent establishment of meso-organisations
for human capital development, such as Pembangunan Sumber Manusia Berhad, the
e¢ ciency of training,  is set highly at 0:9. For the ability distribution, both the lower
bound value, am and the Pareto index parameter, , is set at a minimum value that
would satisfy  > 2 and am > 1.
For imitation parameter,  I1, Lim (2015), in an empirical study using Productivity
and Investment Climate Survey (PICS) dataset for Malaysia, obtains econometric esti-
mates in the range of 0:20 0:35 for a foreign ownership dummy. The upper estimate is
used in our calibration to reect reasonable strength of spillover in the imitation sector,
therefore  I1 = 0:35. On the multiplicative parameter of  
I
2, we set  
I
2 =  0:3 for the
initial baseline to reect a mildly negative tradeo¤ between the productivity of domes-
tic imitators and the cross-term of leading foreign innovation experts and innovative
blueprint stock18
In the innovation sector, based on Yusuf and Nabeshima (2009), we set  R1 = 0:40.
The stepping stone e¤ect parameter,  R2 , is set initially to a high value of 9:5 to reect
the well-documented historically established industrial base in Malaysia (Kharas et
al. 2010), though sensitivity analysis reported later will further assess the e¤ect of a
change in this parameter on the degree of industrial transformation.
In the nal output sector, the elasticity of production with respect to private capital,
, is set at a fairly standard value of 0:3. The elasticity of output with respect to
composite intermediate goods, , is set at 0:3, which is double the value of 0:15 used
by Agénor and Alpaslan (2014) for a low-income economy to reect the industrial status
18As discussed earlier, the parameter  I2 can be interpreted as either a direct negative e¤ect on
imitatorsproductivity as the size of innovation grows or a positive productivity spillover from leading
foreign innovators to domestic imitators, as documented econometrically by Kam (2013). Sensitivity
analysis is therefore implemented to examine the steady-state implications under both cases.
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of Malaysia, though it remains slightly lower than the 0:36 used by Funke and Strulik
(2000) and Sequeira (2011) for developed economies. By implication of the constant
returns-to-scale assumption, that leaves a total of 0:4 between skilled and unskilled
labour. Agénor and Dinh (2013) set U at 0:2 for low-income economies. To adjust
for Malaysias middle-income country status while based on similar proportions to S,
the parameter U is set at 0:15, which leaves S = 0:25. The relative share of basic
intermediate in the composite intermediate inputs, Xt, as measured by , is set at 0:57.
By comparison, Agénor and Alpaslan (2014) use a high value of 0:90 for low-income
economies. Lastly, following Agénor and Dinh (2013), the depreciation rate for private
capital, , is set at 0:068.
For the three labour cost mark-up parameters, an initial state with the order of
innovation, imitation, and nal output sector in terms of rigidity is parameterised, in
consistent with Sander and Hanusch (2012). In Zeufack and Lim (2013), the hiring
cost parameter in their knowledge-intensive sector [their model does not distinguish
between imitation and innovation] is set at 0:10. We set this as the value for I ,
with Y = 0:05 being half of it while R = 0:20 doubles the value to reect greater
di¢ culties in hiring workers for the innovation sector. In the intermediate goods sectors,
the substitution parameter  for domestic production is set at 0:39 to capture a lower
elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs, in comparison to the 0:54 used
by Funke and Strulik (2000) or the 0:60 used by Iacopetta (2011), but similar to
the non-competitive scenario studied in Sequeira (2011). In our views, this captures
the unique context of the Malaysian industry very well a highly specialised global
electrical and electronic component manufacturing hub, and part of the production
network of large foreign MNCs. Lastly, the tax rate on nal output,  , is set equal to
0:25, which corresponds to the average e¤ective tax rate of Malaysia.
Moving on to the foreign sector, in the representative objective function for foreign
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experts in the host economy, recall the assumption of F > F > 1, as in Brambilla et
al. (2009). The between-variety elasticity, F , is rst set arbitrarily at 2. The across-
variety elasticity for foreign preference, F , is then set at 1:64, which is parameterised
to reect a corresponding substitution parameter of 0:61, the value used by Agénor and
Alpaslan (2014) for substitution parameter in the production side. This is deliberately
parameterised to reect the di¤erent preferences of foreign experts who come in with
di¤erent know-how, though the combination of parameterised values for F and F is
reasonably consistent with studies using nested utility framework. The calibration for
the Lerner Index, LI, is based on the average empirical estimates of prot margin,
0:2544, for Malaysian manufacturing rms by Zeufack and Lim (2013). A simple ap-
proximation measure for LI is just 1   0:2544 = 0:7456. For the basic doing-business
cost of F0, a value of 0:2733 is parameterised, based on the average cost of business
start-up procedures as a percentage of real GDP per capita reported in the 2004-08
versions of World Bank Doing Business Surveys. For F1and F2, given the imposed
assumption of F2 > F1 > F0, F1 = 0:33 and F2 = 0:40 are set, which imply that the
cost incurred by foreign subsidiaries to come in with experts with standardisation and
sophisticated know-how would be one-third and forty percent of a baseline price. As
policy scenarios involving cuts in F1and F2 are examined extensively in simulation exer-
cises later, these initial parameterised values are intended to reect an initial situation
where it is expensive for foreign experts to operate in the host economy. In terms of
the asymmetric cost parameter,  =  1 is conveniently set to reect a linear function
of 1=$, with the negative value still allowing us to capture the growing di¢ culties in
identifying the best among the highly skilled workers when the threshold entry value
becomes increasingly lower and restrictive.19
19For the range of parameter values satisfying  < 0, when a convex increasing function of in-
formation cost,  <  1, is used, the system runs into convergence problems quickly. Alternatively,
 >  1 can be used to reect a concave increasing function of 1=$, though those calibrated values
experimented make no signicant di¤erence to the results obtained.
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The total number of foreign experts entering the host economy, NF;t in each period is
normalised to one. In terms of the parameters in the Weibull process used to model the
evolution of foreign preferences, the shape parameter, !k, and the scale parameter, !,
are set equal to 1 and 2 respectively. For the shares of the three di¤erent types, the FDI
composition for Malaysia is estimated using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Due to the constraints of existing FDI statistics classication (by
broad industry or country, not MNCsoperations or value chain), the breakdown based
on American MNCsforeign a¢ liates from BEA is used, as it is the only national agency
with su¢ ciently long time series of such denition.20 Based on the estimates, the initial
proportion of Nonmandated (nFP ), Horizontal (nFH), and Vertical MNCs (nFV ) are
parameterised to equal 0:3099, 0:6737, and 0:0164 respectively. To obtain these initial
values for the MNC-composition in an initial steady state that is saddlepath stable, it
turns out that the constant value ~a, and the constant term, wm in the international
product market dimension feedback channel are set simultaneously at 9:55 and 3:6
respectively. Lastly, based on all the parameterised parameters, we estimate the initial
value of aFP at 24:656.
To establish that the initial steady state is consistent with aFV < aFH < aFP ,
rst, rearranging (29) would allow us to calculate the threshold entry value for Vertical
FDI, aFV , to equal 3:155. Then, given the values for aFV , aFP , the initial steady-
state value for nFH , and other parameters, the threshold value for Horizontal FDI,
aFH , is calculated by rearranging (28), yielding aFH = 23:392 < aFP . The theoretical
condition of aFV < aFH < aFP is therefore satised in the initial steady state.
For the main variables of interest, the calibrations are as follows. From the data,
we know S = 0:240. Further, based on estimated statistics on the percentage share of
20The classication is based on Markusen (1998) and Braconier et al. (2005), and the nancial and
operating data of majority-owned nonbank foreign a¢ liates of U.S. is used to proxy for the composition
of MNCs. See Appendix A for further details.
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R&D researchers in Malaysia, the share of e¤ective skilled labour in innovation, S;R,
is estimated at 0:045. These imply that S;Y = 0:195. Knowing the initial values for
S and S;Y , as well as other calibrated values (am, , , 
S, U), we can calculate
the unskilled labour share in nal output production, U;Y = 0:0231. Then, the share
of unskilled labour, U , is just 0:9856. By implication, the proportion of unskilled
labour working in the imitation sector is then 0:9625. On the industrial composition
ratio, the average of Malaysias share of high technological exports as percentage of
total manufactured exports is calculated for the year between 2008 and 2011, yielding
0:4164. The industrial composition ratio measures the ratio, mt = mIt=(m
R
t + m
I
t ),
which means its initial steady-state value would equal 1 0:4164 = 0:5836. In terms of
measuring the degree of innovation expertise in host economy, the foreign-to-domestic
innovation expertise ratio, 	t, is dened as the ratio of the number of foreign experts
with sophisticated know-how to the number of skilled workers in innovation sector.
Recalling that both NF;t and Lt are normalised to one in the model, we can therefore
write 	t = nFV;t= S;R;t to compute for the innovation expertise ratio in each period.
The initial steady-state value is 	t = 0:3672.
For the generalised logistic curve used to examine endogenous technological di¤usion
later, the calibrations of m = 0:1, M = 0:9, and mI = 0:55 are applied, all of which
are reasonable values for a typical S-curve. The parameter  is set at 1:0 to 5:0, which
indicates a sensitivity analysis of di¤usion rates ranging from 100 to 500 percent, and
the parameter  is calibrated to maintain initial steady-state values at t = 0:57,
mt = 0:5836, and 	t = 0:3672 for the di¤erent cases of .
Finally, for the initial steady-state growth rate of nal output, a multiplicative
constant is introduced to yield both an initial annual growth rate for nal output
and private capital stock to equal 4:3 percent per annum, which corresponds to the
average growth rate for Malaysia in the period of 2008-13. Table 1 and 2 summarise
31
the parameter values for the domestic and foreign sector respectively. Table 3 presents
the parameters used for the generalised logistic curve.
Table 1 Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark (Host Economy)
Table 2 Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark (Host Economy)
Table 3 Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark (Foreign Sector)
5 Policy Experiments
In the debate on FDI-promoting policies, a key issue for developing country policymak-
ers is often whether to adopt a broad-based foreign investment liberalisation measure
or to zero in on selected leading foreign MNCs using targeted investment incentives
[similar to selecting domestic championsin industrial policy]. Moreover, there is also
a large race-to-the-bottomliterature showing that many developing economies com-
peting for FDI [often those using the latter approach] end up failing to achieve their
intended results. In the context of the FDI-promoting policies in this model, we rst set
out to answer this question. Second, for the policies considered, we examine whether
the observed results are a¤ected by a threshold, or merely by the standard level e¤ects.
Third, we assess the question, Does it matter whether the spillover from leading for-
eign Vertical MNCs to the domestic imitators [a still-contradicting empirical nding]
is positive or negative?
After that, we proceed to study the policy externalities between FDI-promoting and
human capital policies. Questions to be answered include Are these policies comple-
mentary or counteracting?Moreover, in an environment where production structure
changes as industry transforms over time, Does endogenous technological di¤usion
propagate or diminish these externalities?
For the issues of interest, policy experiments for both individual and composite pro-
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grammes are examined. As we are mostly interested in the long run e¤ects of policy
interventions, all policy experiments implemented are permanent in nature. We con-
sider ve individual policies: 3 direct measures pertinent to the costs faced by foreign
subsidiaries, and 2 in the broad area of human capital policies [a supply-side measure
of skills acquisition cost cut and a demand-side measure of a labour hiring cost mark-
up cut for innovation]. Similar to Agénor and Dinh (2013), the progress of industrial
transformation [measured by the industrial composition ratio mt = mIt=(m
R
t + m
I
t )]
is the key policy indicator to be examined. To measure progress on the deepening of
domestic innovation expertise, the foreign-to-domestic innovation expertise ratio, 	t,
is introduced as it provides a more meaningful policy interpretation than the individual
measures of the share of Vertical MNCs, nFV;t, and share of skilled labour in innova-
tion, S;R;t. In addition, to ensure that households do not permanently lose out due
to transformation, the long run steady-state e¤ect on aggregate private consumption
growth ( _Ct=Ct) is also evaluated, with a policy option considered to be acceptable only
if the growth rate is sustained or increases in the steady state.21
5.1 Individual Policies
The individual policies considered include: (i) a reduction in skills acquisition cost,  ,
from 0:25 to 0:18; (ii) a cut in the cost mark-up associated with the hiring of skilled
researchers, R, from 0:2 to 0:0; (iii) an economy-wide liberalisation attempt aimed at
reducing general administrative cost for all foreigners in the host economy [cutting F0
from 0:2733 to 0:2433]; (iv) a targeted liberalisation measure to incentivise Horizontal
21When solving for the continuous time dynamic problems over the entire innite time horizon,
the numerical method of relaxation algorithm allocates mesh points unevenly such that the time
di¤erence between result observations generated increasingly widens over time. The steady-state
result therefore would dominate other observations along the time path in any integrable measure like
the conventional welfare calculations. Higher steady-state growth in aggregate private consumption
therefore necessarily reects improvement in welfare.
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operations [cutting F1 from 0:33 to 0:30]; and (v) a targeted measure for Vertical
MNCs [cutting F2 from 0:40 to 0:37].22 The benchmark results both steady-state and
transitional dynamics of these policies, as well as those from selected sensitivity tests,
are presented in Table 4 and Figure 1 respectively.
Briey, we see that both the human capital policies induce more workers to invest
in skills, therefore leading to an expansion in both the proportion of skilled labour
employed in the nal output and the innovation sectors. For both policies, the dynamics
of industrial composition ratio and foreign-domestic innovation expertise ratio exhibit a
scale-back, hump-shaped pattern [which is due to an associated gross complementarity
in the form of an increase in marginal product of unskilled workers and consequently,
unskilled wages, hence mitigating the skills acquisition incentive]. However, in both
cases, the economy does experience a steady-state decrease in industrial composition
ratio and a relative deepening in domestic innovation expertise, with the e¤ects of
the demand-side policy being more pronounced due to the stronger reallocation e¤ect.
Lastly, it is also seen that a larger stepping stone e¤ect,  R2 = 15:5, unambiguously
brings about more signicant results.
Table 4 Individual Policies: Steady-state E¤ects
; Figure 1 Individual Policies: Dynamics
Next, we consider results with regards to the reduction in the doing-businesscosts
for foreign experts, namely the basic doing-business cost, F0, incurred on all foreign
experts in the host economy; the additional cost incurred by foreign subsidiaries of
Horizontal nature, F1; and the additional cost incurred by Vertical operation with
22The rst policy may be thought of as a subsidy scheme designed to reduce the cost of pursuing
advanced education or workplace training, while the other four policies concern deregulation measures
to improve investment climate. These policies can be thought of as being achieved by reallocating
unproductive spending within the budget, so that the tax rate remains the same and the overall
balance remains.
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leading foreign innovation experts, F2. Predictably, a cut in the basic cost of F0 would
unambiguously bring about positive e¤ects on both nFH and nFV . Nonetheless, for the
add-on cost of F1 and F2, by implication of the foreign sector specication where the
two assymmetries are introduced, the policy experiments produce seemingly counter-
intuitive results that may partly help to explain the race-to-the-bottomphenomenon,
where competing host economies o¤ering the best nancial incentives often do not end
up attracting the best foreign innovation experts with frontier know-how.23
Balanced versus Targeted Investment Incentives: The rst FDI policy is-
sues to address is whether a developing host economy ought to pursue a balanced
investment liberalisation agenda or a narrowed targeted incentive focusing only on at-
tracting leading foreign innovation experts. Based on the simulation results, it is the
former that is more innovation-enhancing for a developigng economy undergoing in-
dustrial transformation. This can be understood by rst considering the standalone
reduction of F2 from 0:40 to 0:37, which is a three percentage point-reduction in terms
of the baseline theoretical price [equivalently, in relative terms, a 7:5 percent drop from
the initial 0:40].
While a host economy may intend to attract more foreign experts with sophisticated
know-how by reducing the additional cost incurred on them, this results in an adverse
signalling e¤ect where the proportion of foreign subsidiaries in Vertical mode is reduced.
A reduction in F2 would ceteris paribus, be expected to result in an expansion of the
perceived investment value for a typical foreign experts j with sophisticated know-
how. Nevertheless, given the equi-prot condition used to derive threshold value for
23These are summarised in studies on FDI policy competition, such as Blomström (2002). In es-
sense, this branch of the literature argues that the quality of the enabling environment of investment
[for examples, human capital quality], especially for foreign rms with investments in technologi-
cal leadership areas, a¤ects a countrys ability to attract quality FDI more than direct investment
incentives. Indeed, it can be costly and counterproductive to o¤er investment incentives if the fun-
damentalsof the potential host economy are bad.
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Vertical MNCs, aFV , the asymmetric productivity term, $

FV , would have to adjust, as
seen from (26). The reduction in F2 puts a downward pressure on $FV [and increases
the information cost associated with perceived productivity di¤erence, 1=$FV ], and
this results in a lower and stricter threshold value for Vertical MNCs, aFV . Foreign
subsidiaries are therefore less willing to operate with experts in sophisticated know-how
in the host economy, resulting in a reduction of nFV .
Intuitively, these e¤ects may be interpreted as follows. While typical direct invest-
ment incentives may be attractive to new rms, consistent with observations docu-
mented by Blomström (2002), the reduction in F2, without an accompanying cut in
F0, can lead to an adverse signalling type of outcome. Given the asymmetric struc-
ture specied for the internalisation decision of a typical foreign innovation expert in
Vertical MNC mode, foreign subsidiaries in the host economy would face increasing
di¢ culties in discriminating the best among the most productive ones. This produc-
tivity uncertainty associated with the asymmetric cost structure of a typical Vertical
MNC means a smaller F2 in (26) would result in existing foreign subsidiaries of the host
economy being relatively more wary of the information cost associated with perceived
productivity di¤erence for a typical Vertical operation, 1=$FV [compares to 1=$FH ],
therefore preferring the alternative of Horizontal operation and instead bringing in ex-
perts with standardisation know-how. Hence, nFH increases by 4:4 percentage points
while nFV drops by 0:5 percentage points.
The expansion in nFH then creates a secondary e¤ect: it leads to an expansion
in imitative goods relative to innovative goods in the host economy due to a rise in
productivity of imitation. This results in industrial composition ratio, m, rising by 5:6
percentage points, despite a relative deepening of domestic innovation expertise by 30:2
percent [	 declining from 0:3672 to 0:2563]. This relative deepening is driven by the
signicant drop of foreign experts with sophisticated know-how and not an increase
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in share of skilled researchers, S;R, hence not an ideal policy outcome. Lastly, the
steady-state growth e¤ect is small and mildly positive, but this is again not driven by
gains in industrial transformation. Indeed, in the other sensitivity results concerning
this specic shock summarised in Table 4, the adverse signalling steady-state e¤ects
associated with F2 cut are consistently observed, with the e¤ects on m being stronger
the higher  R1 [greater reliance of domestic innovation in Vertical MNCs], or the higher
 R2 [greater learning associated with the stepping stone e¤ect] is. Indeed, the simulation
results are consistent with the Malaysian experience over the past two decades, where
the Malaysian administration had been among the most active open-doorregime with
respect to o¤ering all forms of targeted incentives to attract foreign rms at the global
frontier, yet failed to attract many of such foreign rms (Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009).
Next, instead of targeted incentive, consider a balanced investment liberalisation
attempt aimed at reducing general administrative cost for all foreigners in the host
economy. This is equivalent to a three percentage point-reduction in F0 from 0:2733 to
0:2433. As F0 is the basic cost incurred on all foreign MNCs, ceteris paribus, this would
create incentives for foreign rms to adopt an improved mode of operation and bring in
foreign experts with more advanced know-how. Given that nFP is treated as a residual,
this would result in an unambiguous increase for both nFH and nFV . For Vertical
MNCs, the reduction in total cost required to be paid every period (F0 + F2) means
there will be an unambiguous increase of nFV by 0:2 percentage points. Similarly, for
Horizontal MNCs, the reduction in total cost required to be paid every period (F0+F1)
results in an increase of nFH by 3:8 percentage points.
The increase in both nFH and nFV leads to an expansion in both the imitation and
the innovation sector, though the latter grows more in relative terms. Specically, the
industrial composition ratio, m, declines by 1:34 percentage points in the steady state.
As the innovation sector expands relatively faster than the imitation sector, more skilled
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workers are relocated out of nal output production compared to unskilled workers
reallocation to imitation. This tends to put a downward pressure on the relative wage
ratio, wU=wS [recall that it is determined by a function of S;Y =U;Y ]. This then creates
greater skills acquisition incentives and leads to an increase in the e¤ective supply of
skilled labour. Specically, in the steady state, these e¤ects translate to moderate
expansions in S and S;R. The relatively small increase in S;R comparing to nFV also
means that the foreign-to-domestic innovation expertise ratio, 	, increases from 0:3672
to 0:4111. In relative terms, this means domestic innovation expertise deteriorates by
12 percent, indicating a growing reliance on foreign innovation experts in the host
economy.
In summary, between the two FDI-promoting policies, it is clear that the balanced
and all-targeting liberalisation measure is more supportive of an economys industrial
transformation and skills expansion than the disproportionate one biased towards only
the leading foreign rms, though the standalone F0 cut does result in growing reliance
on foreign innovation expertise and mildly negative growth24.
Further Analysis on FDI-promoting Policies: Given that F0 is calibrated
based on the basic doing-business cost and therefore captures the institutional quality
aspect faced by foreign investors, a natural extension is to examine whether the policy
results observed are inuenced by the initial parameterised value, and whether there
exists any threshold value. To do these, within the F0 2 [0:159; 0:519] range where
the model still solves, we simulate all three FDI-promoting policies repeatedly across
a grid of four decimal places. A selection of these results are presented in Table 5.
24Ideally, the robustness of the results for F2 shock can be improved further if we could consider
a non-decreasing return specication [non-increasing costly nature to identify the best among the
brightest of skilled workers] for the Vertical MNCs. However, the functional specication is also a
technical necessity to ensure the solution space for a is bounded. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, in
any sensitivity analysis where a convex increasing function of information cost,  <  1, is used, the
system runs into convergence problems quickly.
38
For the basic doing-business cost, F0, the same 11 percent cut is simulated for the
di¤erent initial values. It is noted that there are clear level e¤ects where the higher the
initial cost of doing-business is, the larger the deviation is observed for the industrial
composition ratio, mt. This is the same for the policy of F2 cut, but not the case of
a F1 cut and the results associated with the relative innovation expertise ratio, 	. In
terms of nal output growth, we identify two threshold values one each associated
with F2 and F0 cut.
For the targeted measure to reduce additional cost incurred by Vertical operation,
F2, we identify an initial threshold value of F0 = 0:4310, above which output growth
e¤ect is negative and the model runs into convergence problem. Below this threshold,
the lower the initial doing-business cost is in a host economy, the more room the afore-
mentioned economy has, to continue relying on imitation-driven growth via reverse
transformation. The other more interesting threshold concerns the balanced foreign
investment liberalisation measure, F0, and is key in understanding the FDI-growth
nexus in the context of this model. As noted previously with the benchmark case
[F0 = 0:2733], a standalone F0 cut results in a very mild negative growth e¤ect. It
turns out that there is a threshold value for the initial doing-business cost, below which
nal output growth e¤ect is negative. This value is F0 = 0:2964. The key policy im-
plication from this analysis is therefore that, the usefulness of broad-based investment
liberalisation measure in promoting output growth in a developing host economy de-
pends on its initial doing-business cost as measured by the World Bank. For Malaysia,
its initial doing-business cost is below the threshold value for her to rely solely on F0
cut to promote output growth. However, for the other policy outcomes, we observe
only the standard level e¤ects and not any threshold e¤ect.
Table 5 FDI-promoting Policies: Steady-state E¤ects
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Does it matter whether the spillover from Vertical MNCs to the domestic
imitators is positive or negative?: Indeed, further examination reveals a more
signicant parameter that a¤ects the policy dynamics of the FDI-promoting policies
considered. As seen earlier in the Imitation section, the parameter  I2 measures a
spillover channel from Vertical MNCspresence to the productivity of the domestic
imitators. Given the contradictory empirical evidence, this value can be either positive
or negative. For our policy experiments, it turns out that the choice of  I2 a¤ects
signicantly the transition path of key policy variables. This is clear in Figure 2-4,
which illustrate the transitional dynamics of the two key policy variables of interest
(for di¤erent initial values of F0) in the two separate regime of  
I
2 for F0, F1, and
F2 cut respectively. When  
I
2 > 0, for all three policies, the transition paths display
cyclical properties and for some variables, overshooting patterns. In contrast, when
 I2 < 0, the transition paths are a lot smoother. Nevertheless, in terms of the steady-
state e¤ects, for  I2 > 0 the magnitude of the absolute deviations from baseline tend
to be larger. Hence, for policy implications, the sign does matter for the spillover
channel from Vertical MNCsactivities to the domestic imitatorsproductivity. If a
less volatile transition path for the industrial transformation process is desired, an
environment where the growth of Vertical MNCs in the innovation sector would phase
out the domestic imitators will be more supportive. If the steady-state magnitude of
deregulation measures matters more, then an environment where domestic imitators
gain from the presence of Vertical MNCs is preferred.
Figure 2 Permanent Cut of F0
Figure 3 Permanent Cut of F1
Figure 4 Permanent Cut of F2
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5.2 Composite Programmes
A key goal that policymakers in developing economies often seek to achieve when im-
plementing composite programmes involves identifying the best policy combination to
reap the benets of policy complementarities. The main premise of this study is that a
composite programme delivering the best outcome of industrial transformation, overall
skills expansion, and a deepening of domestic innovation expertise, while simultane-
ously attaining positive changes in nal output and aggregate private consumption
growth rates, will be the preferred composite programme. The key complementarity
between labour and foreign investment liberalisation policies is therefore best illus-
trated here.
Consider three di¤erent composite programmes that constitute some combination of
the ve individual policies considered. Specically, Composite Programme A combines
both the   and R shocks with a balanced combination of foreign cost cuts [simulta-
neous reduction in F0, F1, and F2 by 0:03]. Composite Programme B combines the
two with a proportionate cost cutting programme tilted towards providing investment
incentives for foreign experts with know-how of technological leadership [F0 reduced
by 0:01, F1 reduced by 0:03, and F2 reduced by 0:05], while Composite Programme C
combines the   and R reductions with a third proportionate cost cutting programme
tilted towards providing basic investment incentives to all foreigners [F0 reduced by
0:05, F1 reduced by 0:03, and F2 reduced by 0:01].
The results of the three composite programmes experimented are illustrated in Ta-
ble 6 and Figure 5. The transition paths of the key policy variables examined conform
to what would have been expected when the e¤ects of the individual policies are com-
bined. Both the simultaneous foreign cost cutting programme and the proportionate
cost cutting programme with F0 cut by 0:05 produce positive deviation in the share
of Vertical MNC, nFV , in the steady state. At the same time, the skills acquisition-
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stimulating cost reduction measures of   and R cuts would create greater incentives
for labour to not only undergo training, but also work in the innovation sector. The
increase in skilled labour supply would initially put a downward pressure on skilled
wages. However, due to the overall increase in skilled employment occurring in both
the innovation (S;R) and nal output sector (S;Y ), a secondary e¤ect would also be at
play: the expansion of innovative blueprints relative to imitative blueprints, and con-
versely, the varieties of sophisticated intermediate inputs relative to basic inputs. This
shift towards innovation raises the productivity of labour in that sector, which magni-
es the initial e¤ect. Nonetheless, the increase in the supply of skilled labour in nal
output production would also raise marginal product of unskilled workers, which then
raises unskilled wages. This then mitigates the initial e¤ect on incentives to acquire
skills, and the labour market adjustment dynamics are reected in the hump-shaped
pattern associated with mt and 	t in Figure 5.
The decline in imitative varieties would further feed back into the foreign rms
internalisation process, which creates a tertiary dynamic that is then reected in the
cyclical pattern of m and 	. The decline in imitative varieties makes the host econ-
omy less attractive as a host to Horizontal MNCs, but at the same time improves the
incentive for foreign innovation experts with sophisticated know-how to enter. In the
case of Composite Programme A, this therefore mitigates the initial decline in nFV and
results in an overall increase of nFV in steady state, while in the case of Composite
Programme C, it further leads to growth in the share of foreign innovation experts in
the host economy. Overall, while the host economy would experience improvements
in both industrial composition and relative domestic innovation expertise under both
Composite Programme A and Composite Programme C, the balanced Composite Pro-
gramme A would be the better programme as it sustains aggregate private consumption
growth.
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In contrast, the Composite Programme B results in largely opposite results. The
share of foreign experts in the Vertical MNC mode, nFV , would decline due to the
adverse signalling e¤ects associated with the large F2 cut. This then results in reverse
transformationtowards imitation, less incentive to acquire skills and work in innova-
tion sector, hence a drop in both e¤ective skilled workers, S, and those employed in
the innovation sector, S;R. In terms of steady-state aggregate private consumption
growth, Composite Programme B predictably delivers the largest gain of 0:22 percent-
age points, but unlike the preferred Composite Programme A, this is maintained by
not making progress in industrial transformation.
Table 6 Composite Programmes: Steady-state E¤ects
Figure 5 Composite Programmes: Dynamics
Overall, the policy experiment results are consistent with the consensus views doc-
umented in Saggi (2002) and Faeth (2009), where evidence on the direct role of FDI in
promoting domestic innovation is mixed, but their indirect impacts tend to be positive
if their presence leads to a deepening of domestic innovation expertise. Likewise, when
the externality parameter associated with learning e¤ects in the innovation sector [the
stepping stone e¤ect from the stock of imitative goods,  R2 ] is calibrated at a higher
value, the steady-state e¤ects on both the industrial composition ratio and foreign-
domestic innovation expertise ratio are unambiguously more e¤ective in all three com-
posite programmes. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which presents the steady-state
deviations of mt for the balanced Composite Programme A across di¤erent combina-
tions of  R2 and  
I
2. The strong e¤ects associated with a larger stepping stone are
consistent with Agénor and Dinh (2013).
Figure 6 Composite Programme A - Industrial composition ratio
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5.3 Endogenous Technological Change, Policy Complemen-
tarities
Lastly, the three composite programmes are examined again, in scenarios where the
production parameter, t, is allowed to vary as the industrial composition ratio changes
over time. The steady-state e¤ects for the key variables of interest are presented in
Table 7. For all three composite programmes, endogenising t generates more sensitive
results, and the higher the di¤usion rate,  considered, the greater the steady-state
e¤ects documented. In addition, we also examine for policy complementarities between
the human capital and FDI-promoting policies. As shown in Table 8, there are clearly
positive policy complementarity e¤ects, since the composite programme generates long-
run gains that exceed those generated by the sum of the individual policies.
Indeed, the policy complementarity e¤ect is stronger the higher the di¤usion rate
is. For instance, at the highest  value examined ( = 5:0), Composite Programme A
would lead t to decline from 0:57 to 0:496. This would result in a reduction of  7:8
percentage points in the industrial composition ratio (in comparison, in the bench-
mark model with xed , m declines by 4:9 percentage points), and expansion of S
and S;R by 2:0 and 1:8 percentage points respectively. In terms of the deepening of
domestic innovation expertise, the foreign-domestic innovation expertise ratio, 	 de-
creases more signicantly despite both S;R and nFV having increased. At the same
time, the steady-state e¤ect on aggregate private consumption growth would be higher
too, growing by 0:21 percentage points. The nal output growth rate increases from
4:3 to 4:5 percentage points. These indicate across-the-boardgains, underlying the
signicance of endogenous technological change in magnifying the benets of policy
complementarity between the human capital and FDI-promoting policies.
Table 7 Sensitivity Analysis: Endogenous technological change
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Table 8 Policy Complementarities - Composite Programme A
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops an imitation-innovation model with heterogeneous labour and for-
eign MNCs explained at the disaggregated level of foreign experts. The novel contribu-
tions include formalising a framework to explain internalisation advantage[Dunnings
OLI /Eclectic Paradigm] for heterogeneous MNCs and the determination of their com-
position. Based on Agénor and Dinh (2013), industrial transformation was measured
by changes in an index of industrial structure. This idea that is Romerian-based is
further supplemented by a novel foreign multinationalssorting framework that allows
us to model the dichotomous relationship between domestic and foreign rms. Unlike
the former, foreign experts perceive heterogeneity among the productivity of domestic
workers. As productivity is a transformation of ability, this allows us to link the skills
acquisition decision and foreign subsidiariesoperational mode choice along the same
ability distribution in the host economy. In addition, asymmetry is introduced specif-
ically for Vertical MNCs to capture the increasingly costly nature for foreign experts
to identify the best among the most productive workers.
Using a parameterised version of the model, we conduct both individual and com-
posite policy experiments to examine the steady-state and transitional e¤ects of these
policies. The key policy implications derived have been discussed in the Introduction
section and therefore need not be repeated here. Instead, there remain limitations
in the study that future research can address. For this reasonably complicated high-
dimensional model, some policy elements are not pursued, largely as a self-contained
measure to ease computational burden, but are obvious aspects for extensions. For
instance, the role of scal policy in the model is minimal. Second, while the model
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establishes indirect feedback from the skills channel to FDI composition, a direct feed-
back channel of human capital to FDI is not modelled. For future research, notably in
a model with Lucas type of disembodied human capital and more traditional modelling
of FDI as capital, this would obviously be worth examining.
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Tables and Figures 
Table 3
Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark (for Foreign sector)
Parameter Value Description
F 2.0 Elasticity of foreign preference, between varieties
F 1.64 Elasticity of foreign preference, across varieties
P0 1.0 Baseline price, Platform FDI’s investment
LI 0.7456 Lerner Index, proxy for pricing competition
F0 0.2733 Basic doing-business cost incurred on foreign experts
F1 0.33 Additional cost incurred on Horizontal MNC
F2 0.40 Additional cost incurred on Vertical MNC
ã 9.55 Constant value linking productivity to ability
 −1.0 Asymmetric cost parameter, Vertical MNC-specific
k 1.0 Shape parameter, Weibull function
 2.0 Slope parameter, spread of Weibull distribution
wm 3.6 Constant, feedback to foreign preference
Table 1
Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark (for Host Economy)
Parameter Value Description
Households
 0.04 Annual discount rate
 0.27 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
n 0.0173 Population growth rate
 0.9 Productivity parameter (efficiency of skills acquisition)
Γ 0.25 Skills acquisition cost (in proportion of skilled wage)
 2.001 Pareto index, breadth of ability distribution in host economy
Final Output
 0.3 Elasticity with respect to private capital
U 0.15 Elasticity with respect to unskilled labour
S 0.25 Elasticity with respect to skilled labour
 0.3 Elasticity wrt composite intermediate input
 0.57 Share of basic input in composite intermediate input
Y 0.05 Cost mark-up due to labour market distortions
 0.068 Rate of depreciation, private capital
Intermediate goods
 0.39 Substitution parameter for production, intermediate goods
Table 2
Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark (for Host Economy, continue)
Parameter Value Description
Imitation sector
1I 0.35 Elasticity wrt number of foreign experts in Horizontal mode
2I −0.3 Externality, Vertical MNCs and innovative blueprint
I 0.1 Cost mark-up due to labour market distortions
Innovation sector
1R 0.4 Elasticity wrt number of foreign experts in Vertical mode
2R 9.5 Stepping stone effect, from stock of imitative goods
R 0.2 Cost mark-up due to labour market distortions
Government
 0.25 Effective tax rate on final output
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FDI‐promoting Policies: Steady‐state Effects for Different Initial Level of Basic Doing‐Business Cost (F0)
F0 shock F1 shock F2 shock
Initial F0
0.20 ‐0.01201 0.03890 ‐0.00059 ‐0.03477 0.03901 ‐0.00102 0.05360 ‐0.10279 0.00322
0.25 ‐0.01306 0.04603 ‐0.00029 ‐0.03323 0.04654 ‐0.00197 0.05573 ‐0.11939 0.00242
0.30 ‐0.01413 0.05153 0.00002 ‐0.03400 0.05224 ‐0.00198 0.05760 ‐0.12096 0.00165
0.35 ‐0.01499 0.05240 0.00030 ‐0.03478 0.05457 ‐0.00170 0.05902 ‐0.11267 0.00094
0.40 ‐0.01573 0.05007 0.00053 ‐0.03535 0.05311 ‐0.00141 0.06016 ‐0.09951 0.00031
0.45 ‐0.01634 0.04588 0.00074 ‐0.03576 0.04928 ‐0.00115 0.06028 ‐0.09051 ‐0.00003
0.50 ‐0.01680 0.04083 0.00093 ‐0.03601 0.04427 ‐0.00092
Note: For F2 shock, the model  solves  only up to F0 = 0.431, which produce the results highlighted in red.
Absolution deviation from baseline Absolution deviation from baseline Absolution deviation from baseline
Table 5
mt  t Ẏt/Yt mt mt t  tẎt/Yt Ẏt/Yt
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Figure 2: Permanent Cut of  F0 by the same percent as Benchmark 0.03 Cut  
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 3: Permanent Cut of  F1 by the same percent as Benchmark 0.03 Cut  
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 4: Permanent Cut of  F2 by the same percent as Benchmark 0.03 Cut,  
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 6: Composite Programme A ‐ Industrial composition ratio 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Table 7
S ensitivity Analysis: Endogenous  with Generalised Logistic C urve
C omposite P rogrammes: S teady- state Effects (Abs deviation)
Initial values C omposite A C omposite B C omposite C C omposite A C omposite B C omposite C
100% diffusion rate,   1 . 0 400% diffusion rate,   4. 0
m 0 .5836 - 0.0535 - 0.0054 - 0.0902 m - 0 .0709 - 0.0076 - 0 .1141
 S 0 .2400 0.0105 0 .0068 0.0143  S 0.0165 0.0075 0 .0238
 S R 0 .0446 0.0101 0 .0083 0.0118  S R 0.0155 0.0089 0 .0205
C /C 0 .0430 0.0009 0 .0022 - 0.0007 C /C 0.0017 0.0023 0 .0008
 0 .3672 - 0.0566 - 0.1262 - 0.0112  - 0 .0931 - 0.1294 - 0 .0764
 0 .5700 - 0.0097 - 0.0010 - 0.0164  - 0 .0532 - 0.0055 - 0 .0859
200% diffusion rate,   2 . 0 500% diffusion rate,   5. 0
m 0 .5836 - 0.0585 - 0.0060 - 0.0978 m - 0 .0780 - 0.0087 - 0 .1217
 S 0 .2400 0.0121 0 .0070 0.0169  S 0.0195 0.0078 0 .0280
 S R 0 .0446 0.0116 0 .0085 0.0142  S R 0.0182 0.0092 0 .0243
C /C 0 .0430 0.0011 0 .0022 - 0.0003 C /C 0.0021 0.0023 0 .0015
 0 .3672 - 0.0670 - 0.1271 - 0.0310  - 0 .1090 - 0.1309 - 0 .1010
 0 .5700 - 0.0215 - 0.0021 - 0.0361  - 0 .0739 - 0.0080 - 0 .1153
300% diffusion rate,   3 . 0
m 0 .5836 - 0.0643 - 0.0067 - 0.1059
 S 0 .2400 0.0141 0 .0072 0.0200
 S R 0 .0446 0.0134 0 .0086 0.0171
C /C 0 .0430 0.0013 0 .0023 0.0002
 0 .3672 - 0.0791 - 0.1280 - 0.0528
 0 .5700 - 0.0358 - 0.0035 - 0.0592  
Table 8
Policy Complementarities - Composite Programme A
(Absolute deviations)
m  S SR C/C 
Sum of Parts:
Γcut -0.0043 0.0069 0.0013 0.0003 -0.0145
R cut -0.0325 0.0014 0.0072 0.0009 -0.0553
F 0 cut -0.0134 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0439
F 1 cut -0.0333 0.0038 0.0009 -0.0022 0.0431
F 2 cut 0.0560 -0.0036 -0.0009 0.0022 -0.1109
Aggregate effects -0.0275 0.0087 0.0086 0.0011 -0.0937
Composite A (fixed ) -0.0489 0.0092 0.0089 0.0007 -0.0477
Composite A (endogenous )
-   1.0 -0.0535 0.0105 0.0101 0.0009 -0.0566
-   2.0 -0.0585 0.0121 0.0116 0.0011 -0.0670
-   3.0 -0.0643 0.0141 0.0134 0.0013 -0.0791
-   4.0 -0.0709 0.0165 0.0155 0.0017 -0.0931
-   5.0 -0.0780 0.0195 0.0182 0.0021 -0.1090
 
